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LEGAL LABYRINTH?
DIANE T. WEBER*
1. INTRODUCTION
The 1989 creation by Texaco, Inc. and Saudi Refining Inc.,' of a
refining and marketing joint venture-Star Enterprise-is yet another
example of the continued interest in United States/Saudi Arabian busi-
ness combinations. However, it may signal a change in Saudi foreign
investment from ventures located in Saudi Arabia to ventures, like Star
Enterprise, located outside the country. Since the passage of the For-
eign Capital Investment Code2 in 1979, joint ventures between Saudi
companies and United States companies have increased due to incen-
tives presented by the Saudi government. However, the rise in the
number of joint ventures has not been a result of the ease of structuring
such operations or simple legal considerations.
The structure and operation of Saudi Arabian law poses many
challenges for United States companies or individuals interested in joint
venture combinations with Saudi companies or, as is common in Saudi
Arabia, with the Saudi government. These challenges stem from the
peculiarities of Islamic Law as well as from the inconsistencies of gov-
ernmental legislation relating to corporate, contract and foreign invest-
ment law. While investment in Saudi Arabia can be advantageous to a
United States investor, these challenges create a labyrinth of legal ob-
stacles that must be overcome before structuring a joint venture in the
Kingdom.
This comment will examine the major legal challenges3 faced by
companies wishing to establish a United States/Saudi joint venture.
* J.D. 1990, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. 1987, Oklahoma State
University.
I Saudis Sign with Texaco for Venture in U.S. in Bid to Become Major Refiner,
Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1988, at C13, col. 1 [hereinafter Saudi Texaco Venture].
Foreign Capital Investment Code, Royal Decree M/4, 2/2/1399 (Jan. 1, 1979),
reprinted in 2 A. Keesee, Commercial Laws of the Middle East: The Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (1986).
1 This paper does not address the social, cultural, and political challenges foreign
investors face. However, these factors can be significant and must be taken into consid-
eration by the foreign investor. The political volatility of the region, for example, can
have serious repercussions on any investment in Saudi Arabia as the 1990 Middle East
Crisis illustrates.
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The scope of the comment will be limited to joint venture formation
within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It will-begin with a discussion of
Islamic Law principles which influence all areas of commercial and
contract law. The comment will then examine the aspects of the Saudi
Limited Liability Company, the Foreign Capital Investment Code, the
Tenders Regulations and the Arbitration Regulations which act as im-
pediments to the formation of United States/Saudi joint ventures.
2. ISLAMIc LAW
When contemplating formation of a joint venture between a
United States investor and a Saudi partner, one of the first considera-
tions for the United States investor and its counsel must be of general
principles of Saudi law. Ignorance of Saudi law has led to delays, ob-
stacles and even premature termination of projects for foreign inves-
tors.' Saudi Arabia does have specific regulations governing the forma-
tion, licensing and operation of companies jointly owned by Saudi
nationals or entities and foreign nationals or entities. However, consul-
tation of Saudi law should not be limited to these regulations only:
[I]f [an investor's] contacts with [Saudi Arabia] are to be
anything more than superficial, [the investor] should be fa-
miliar with the general principles of Islamic law in areas
such as contracts, property, and torts. Not only are these
principles fundamental in themselves, but they may help to
provide a better understanding of the reasons a business
transaction is conducted in a particular manner.
5
Compliance with the specific regulations will be easier if one has an
understanding of the premises upon which Islamic Law is based. Such
an understanding will also help protect the United States company
from legal complications that can develop as the joint venture begins to
take shape and eventually becomes operational.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy' and is
governed by Islamic Law, a law deeply set in religion.7 The executive
' Comment, Establishing An Enterprise In Saudi Arabia: A Focus on A Joint
Limited Liability Partnership, Contract Negotiating, Labor Laws, and Income Tax
Consequences for Non- Saudis, 3 Hous. J. Int'l L. 299, 299 (1981).
' Note, A Practitioner's Introduction to Saudi Arabian Law, 16 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 138 (1983).
8 Simpson, Introduction to the Legal System of Saudi Arabia, in 2 A. KEESEE,
supra note 2, at 4.
" See generally Brand, Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law and Practice, 9 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) ("Islamic belief does not separate faith from law.");
Comment, The Influence of Islamic Law on Contemporary Middle Eastern Legal Sys-
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and legislative powers of regulations and legislation in the Kingdom are
"concentrated in the Council of Ministries subject to the absolute au-
thority of the King."' The constitution of the Kingdom is the holy
book, the Qur'an.' Although the Qur'an serves as the constitution of
the country, it contains relatively few verses which are of legal conse-
quence; most of these verses deal with family law and inheritance.' As
a result, many of the regulations governing legal, commercial and con-
tract areas are promulgated in the form of royal decrees."
The law in Saudi Arabia is called Shari'a which means "the Path
to be followed."' 2 Shari'a is considered to be divine law, given from
Allah, and "regulates the entirety of human conduct in the moral, ethi-
cal, religious, social and legal spheres."' 3 Because the constitution of
the Kingdom is the Qur'an, religious, moral and ethical considerations
spill over into the legal areas of commercial and contract law: "In
Saudi Arabia, as in other Muslim countries, religion and law are insep-
arable."'1 4 Therefore, it is imperative that an attorney counseling a for-
eign investor examine such aspects of Saudi Law:
It is in the differences of shari'a law, the law's religious ori-
gins, its role as protector of the Islamic faith and guide to
daily social life, and its historical aversion to contemporary
reinterpretation, and in Western lawyers' ignorance of these
differences, that misunderstandings arise. 5
Western attorneys can be lulled into a false sense of comprehension of
the legal system of Saudi Arabia because legislation and royal decrees
in the Kingdom bear a resemblance in form to Western legislation. Al-
though there appears to be such similarity, an attorney must never for-
get that "[t]he Shari'a is still, however, very much the law in Saudi
tems: The Formation and Binding Force of Contracts, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
384, 386 (1970) ("Islamic law regulates the conduct between man and God and be-
tween man and man.").
' Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relation to Other Legal Systems, 26 AM. J. CoMP. L.
187, 188 (1978).
9 Brand, supra note 7, at 3. Many Arabic words have several alternate spellings,
each equally correct. For this reason, Arabic words that appear within this comment
are reproduced as they appear in the original, rather than conformed to the spelling
chosen for this comment. Similarly, where the author of the quoted material chose not
to italicize words, they appear in the comment as in the original.
10 Of 6,237 verses, only approximately three percent or one hundred ninety, can
be considered to be of legal consequence. Id.; Badr, supra note 8, at 188.
11 Asherman, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: The Contemporary Application of
Islamic Law, 16 INT'L LAW. 321, 324-26 (1982).
12 A. Doi, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 2 (1984).
13 Comment, supra note 7, at 387.
14 Note, supra note 5, at 115.
15 Brand, supra note 7, at 2.
1990]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
Arabia."' 6 Because the Shari'a is the law of God, even legislation and
royal decrees are secondary to it. Furthermore, all legislation and royal
decrees must be in keeping with the Shari'a and must not contradict it.
As a corollary, a Saudi national or company cannot agree to be bound
by any other law besides the Shari'a.1 Consequently, a company wish-
ing to invest with a Saudi company must be willing to subject itself to
the Shari'a. Before doing so, the company must be familiar with the
law:
Even Western attorneys who engage exclusively in Saudi
corporate law will find themselves at a distinct disadvantage
without at least a passing acquaintance with the fundamen-
tals of the Islamic faith and the general principles of Islamic
contract law. It is critical, moreover, for Western attorneys to
be familiar with Arab social mores and customs if they are to
effectively advise or represent United States clients doing
business in Saudi Arabia.' 8
An example further underscores the importance of the necessity of be-
ing familiar with not only the regulations regarding commercial trans-
actions in the Kingdom, but also with other aspects of the Shari'a and
the Saudi Arabian culture as well: Saudi law will render a contract
null and void if it contains a provision which is illegal. In doing so,
Saudi law does not differ from many other legal systems which will not
recognize contracts that are formed with an illegal purpose. 9 However,
the United States investor can be in trouble when the Shari'a will not
recognize contracts which contain what might be a seemingly innocent
subject to the investor but which turns out to be proscribed by the reli-
gious law of the Qur'an.2 ° For example, the inclusion in a contract of a
provision for the trading of alcoholic beverages will render the entire
contract null and void because alcoholic beverages are prohibited in the
Kingdom.2 It is advisable to be familiar with Saudi social customs and
1s Asherman, supra note 11, at 337.
17 Cf Ministry of Commerce, Memorandum on Arbitration Clauses, 3/3/1756,
24/5/1399, reprinted in 2 A. KEESEE, supra note 2 (An arbitration clause "providing
for the submission of any disputes arising between contract parties to an arbitration
committee outside the kingdom . . . contained in the charter of a Saudi company is
considered absolutely void"); Brand, supra note 7, at 29 (There is no reason for conflict
of laws doctrine. Only Shari'a law and Shari'a courts may prevail because Shari'a is
God's law and all other laws are man's).
Is Note, supra note 5, at 115.
'9 N. COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE GULF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL
TRADITION 43 (1984).
20 Id.
21 Id.; Brand, supra note 7, at 27-28.
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traditions as well: "[T]he Western attorney should not underestimate
the active role which tradition, custom, and the Arab viewpoint play in
the Saudis' daily business practices, because even an unintended social
faux pas can upset a sensitive business negotiation."22 Inquiring about
a Saudi's family, except as to the family's health, and uninvited conver-
sation regarding religion and politics are examples of cultural taboos.2"
As might be obvious, a company wishing to undertake a joint ven-
ture with a Saudi company should retain counsel who is familiar with
Islamic law and traditions. There has been an increase in the amount
of legislation promulgated in the Kingdom due to the increased com-
plexities of the business environment.24 Should this trend continue, as is
expected, "access to and understanding of the latest Saudi legal devel-
opments will be increasingly critical to successful business there."'2 5 Re-
strictions on the ability of foreign attorneys to practice law in the King-
dom affect the possibility of being able to obtain a competent United
States attorney with the experience necessary for the complex negotia-
tions of structuring a joint venture. Only Saudi nationals are able to
obtain licenses to practice law in the Kingdom,2" although non-Saudi
attorneys may be employed in the office of a Saudi legal consultant.
27
The non-Saudi attorney can perform only limited duties: "The work of
the employed consultant shall be confined to the preparation of memos
in the name of the Saudi consultant and to providing the Saudi consult-
ant with counsel and technical assistance within the scope of office
work."2" Furthermore, the non-Saudi attorney is "banned from practic-
ing the profession of legal consultation in the Kingdom in any manner,
whether independently or in partnership with a Saudi individual or
office." 29 Although legal consultation is not defined by the Minister of
Commerce in Ministerial Resolution 1190, it is clear that the resolution
was designed to restrict the legal practice to Saudis. This policy forces
the United States company to seek Saudi counsel to provide necessary
expertise for the company in understanding and interpreting Saudi
laws."
22 Note, supra note 5, at 115.
23 Id. at 176.
24 Homsy, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Saudi Arabia, 16 INT'L LAW. 51,
66 (1982).
25 Id.
26 Minister of Commerce Ministerial Resolution 1190, art. 11 16/2/1402 (Dec.
12, 1981), reprinted in 5 MID. E. EXEC. REP., Feb. 1982, at 26.
27 Id. art. IV, reprinted in 5 MID. E. EXEC. REP., Feb. 1982, at 27.
28 Id.
29 Id. art. VI.
0 See Note, supra note 5, at 173.
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2.1. Contractual Agreements Under Saudi Law
Awareness and understanding of the high value placed on personal
honor and on the sanctity of contracts in Saudi Arabia are critical to
success for the United States investor. Both factors will influence the
approach taken by the Saudi partner in negotiations as well as the ex-
pectations the Saudi company will have of the United States partner to
fulfill its obligations. The Saudis often consider "each man's word as
legally reliable as a contract provision. "31 The United States investor
must consider the fact that it is a rare occurrence for a Saudi business-
man to go back on his word once it is given, "regardless of the legal
arrangements." 2 The Saudi will, in all likelihood, expect no less from
the United States investor. 3
In Saudi Arabia, contracts are considered sacred:
In a Muslim's priority of obligations, adherence to contract
ranks below only one's obligations to God and to family.
Contracts are the shari'a of the parties, and no distinction is
made between public agreements such as treaties and private
contracts; both are pacts to which God is a witness and both
therefore must be observed. 4
Muslim attorneys have commented that "[t]he contract is the shari'a or
sacred law of the contracting parties."3 Although Shari'a is synony-
mous with traditional Muslim or Islamic law, "[i]t is also, in a nar-
rower meaning, the bargain made between two contracting parties."3"
This concept suggests that not only is the Shari'a the law of the King-
dom, but that it is also "man's law, the 'law' that private parties to a
mutual contract establish for themselves. ' '3'* A contract'breach becomes
more than simply an unfulfilled obligation for which a remedy is avail-
able. It is a transgression of ihe law as well as a serious affront to the
Saudi company. Therefore, the United States investor simply cannot
afford to underestimate the importance of the agreement to the Saudi
partner. Should the investor act "dishonorably" and breach a contract
31 Id. at 175.
32 Id.
" Such an expectation is not far-fetched to the Saudi because the Saudi will hold
that the laws of contract and obligation of Saudi Arabia are applicable to foreigners
and non-Muslims. Asherman, supra note 11, at 329. A passage from the Qur'an states
"0 ye who believe! fulfill your undertakings." Brand, supra note 7, at 27. "Saudis
attach a great deal of Weight to confidence and trust in all relationships, whether busi-
ness or private and will hold a person to his word." Comment, supra note 4, at 304.
3" Brand, supra note 7, at 27.
3 "Al-'aqd Shariat al-muta'aqqidin." Id. at 7- Asherman, supra note 11, at 335.
3 Brand, supra note 7, at 7.
37 Id.
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or contract provision, the investor will lose face with the Saudi partner
and may find it difficult to find other Saudis with whom to do business.
Consider, as an example of the sanctity of the contract in Saudi Arabia,
the following:
[T]he government [of Saudi Arabia] once renounced its sov-
ereign immunity in an arbitration with the Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Company, adjuring that the company and the gov-
ernment 'have never entertained the thought that they would
not be bound by the agreement they have made .... *38
Because the Qur'an has few legal provisions, Shari'a contract law
has tended to evolve through experience, similar to the evolution of
common law in the United States."9 However, unlike common law in
the United States, binding precedent is not a concept of Saudi Law."'
Therefore, a company cannot rely on past experiences or past Saudi
court decisions as definitive. Although the situation may be similar, no
court is bound by a previous decision.
3. THE JOINT VENTURE
Once a company begins to sort through and understand the prem-
ises of Shari'a, it can begin to focus on the particular regulations to be
complied with in order to form the joint venture. The penalties for non-
compliance with any of the regulations range from fines to expulsion
from doing business in the Kingdom.4' Complying with the regulations
is no easy task because many of the regulations are not as straight for-
ward as they appear. The officially promulgated regulations (royal de-
crees) are not the exclusive vehicle by which the government regulates
companies. There are also government officials and committees oversee-
ing the activities of foreign investors in the Kingdom. These officials
continually make policy decisions and have the delegated authority to
make regulations. These regulations are contained in ministerial or ad-
38 Id. at 27.
sB Id.; see Badr, supra note 8, at 189 ("The case law. . . was not reflected in
court decisions; the cases were rather situations, real or hypothetical, formulated for
discussion and resolved according to the teachings of the particular school of law to
which the jurist belonged.").
40 Simpson, supra note 6, at 4.
41 See Companies Regulations, Royal Decree M/6, art. 229, 22/3/1385 (1965),
as amended by Royal Decrees M/5, 12/2/1387, M/23, 28/6/1402 and M/46, 4/7/
1405, reprinted in 2 A. KEESEE, supra note 2. See also Cartwright & Hamza, Service
Agents Regulation and Related Laws Affecting Foreign Companies in Saudi Arabia,
17 INT'L LAW. 203, 212 (1983) ("One sanction for violation of the Regulation by a
foreign company is that it may be prohibited from engaging in any further business in
Saudi Arabia.").
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ministrative memoranda and circulars.42 The problem posed to the
United States investor by these regulations is that although they carry
the same weight as royal decrees,4" they are not published in the Offi-
cial Gazette."' Limited knowledge of and access to such regulations
may therefore make it extremely difficult for a company to comply with
them.
3.1. Registration
Any company wishing to operate in the Kingdom must obtain per-
mission to do so." Permission is granted in the form of temporary or
permanent commercial registration with the Saudi government.4 6 The
only difference between temporary and permanent registration is that
permanent registration establishes continuity. Temporary registration is
valid only for short contracts and the company must re-apply with each
new contract it obtains.47 Therefore, a United States company estab-
lishing a joint venture with a Saudi company will want to obtain per-
manent registration.
Registration serves three primary government objectives: 1) ensur-
ing that the company renders a service that is needed in Saudi Arabia;
2) ensuring that the company is not on the Israeli Boycott List;4" and
3) permitting the government an opportunity to determine whether the
foreign company has a Saudi agent and if not, the reason why.49 Al-
though registration primarily serves these purposes, it also provides sev-
eral benefits for the United States company, such as "[s]ponsorship of
expatriate employees, rental of property, exporting of equipment [as
well as] other necessary activities for the execution of a contract."'
3.2. Participation
Complying with registration requirements alone, however, is not
42 Asherman, supra note 11, at 325.
43 Id.
44 All royal decrees become effective upon publication in the Official Gazette. Id.
41 Santire, Participation and Registration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 15
INT'L LAW. 561, 562 (1981).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Listed companies are those that conduct business with Israel. Several Arab
countries, Saudi Arabia included, have joined together to boycott Israeli goods as well
as companies that do business with Israel. If a company is on the list, it would be
disqualified from doing business in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 563. See L. GLICK, TRADING
WITH SAUDI ARABIA 565 (1980); Code of Regulations for the Boycott of Israel, Royal
Decree 27, 25/6 (Nov. 23, 1962), reprinted in L. GLICK, supra, at 574.
41 Santire, supra note 45, at 563.
10 Id. at 562.
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enough for the company to begin operations. The United States com-
pany must obtain the participation of a Saudi national or company in
order to operate in the Kingdom.5 Participation can take two forms,
agency or joint venture.52 There are two types of joint ventures, the
contractual joint venture and the mixed company. 53 The mixed com-
pany involves equity ownership by both a Saudi national or company
and a foreign national or company. It is the more beneficial joint ven-
ture form for a United States company to take because, with the Saudi
ownership, the mixed company has juristic legal personality54 in the
Kingdom. One form of mixed company, the limited liability company,
is the governmentally favored avenue for investment in Saudi Arabia by
foreign entities.55 The government has gone so far as to require that
any contractor dealing with the government have a Saudi agent or part-
ner. 56 Although it is possible for a United States company to operate in
the Kingdom with only a Saudi agent,57 Saudi government policy tends
to favor increased joint involvement between foreign and Saudi entities.
"[T]he Government welcomes foreign capital as well as foreign exper-
tise and their participation in industrial development ventures in coop-
eration with Saudi businessmen.' 58 Indirectly, through such policy, the
Saudi government has successfully controlled the choice of business
form.
3.3. The Saudi Joint Venture vs. The Limited Liability Company
The Saudi joint venture and the limited liability company are two
business forms which allow foreign participation in the Kingdom. The
Saudi joint venture however, is the less beneficial of the two for the
United States company. The joint venture is often a short term contrac-
61 Id. at 564.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 565.
54 Taylor, Alternative Legal Structures for Doing Business in Saudi Arabia:
Distributorship, Agency, Branch, Joint Venture and Professional Office, 12 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 77, 87 (1980).
55 Santire, supra note 45, at 566.
56 Service Agents Regulation, Royal Decree M/2, art. 2, 21/2/1398 (Jan. 20,
1979), reprinted in L. GLICK, supra note 48, at 161; see also Santire, Registration
and the Saudi Associate: Choices in the Kingdom, 5 MID. E. EXEC. REP., Apr. 1982,
5, 7.
67 Foreign investors can operate in the Kingdom without an agent in the areas of
armaments and related services where agency is prohibited. However, Saudi partner-
ship in a joint venture is permissible in these areas. Service Agents Regulation, supra
note 56, art. 3.
58 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, SAUDI BUSINESS & LABOR LAW 63 (1987) (quoting
Industrial Policy Statement, para. X, Dalil Al-Istithmar al-sina't 66 (6th ed. 1404))
(emphasis in original).
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tual arrangement, similar to joint ventures as they are known in the
United States.59 Article 40 of the Saudi Companies Regulations 0
(hereinafter Companies Regulations), which governs businesses in the
Kingdom, defines a joint venture as "an association of which third par-
ties are not aware, which does not have legal personality and which is
not subject to publication formalities."'" Besides lacking the benefits
granted to the limited liability company, the chief drawback of the con-
tractual joint venture is that it is a tenuous agreement between two
parties for a narrow objective and usually for a short time period.
6 2
Another shortcoming is that the joint venture is an impractical choice
for the United States company to make because the partner who deals
with the third party is solely liable for any damages, unless the third
party knows of the combination, in which case all partners are liable.63
The United States company is therefore forced to disclose its participa-
tion in order to protect itself from heavy liability. Practically then, the
joint venture combination is never hidden from third parties.64
The limited liability company is the most advantageous and prac-
tical"5 form of investment for the United States company to take with a
Saudi partner; it is also the most popular form.66 The Companies Reg-
ulations define the limited liability partnership67 as "a partnership con-
sisting of two or more partners who are responsible for the debts of the
partnership to the extent of their respective interests in capital, and in
which the number of partners shall not exceed fifty."6 a Further refer-
ences to joint ventures in this paper shall be to a Saudi limited liability
company. The limited liability company can operate in all areas of
Saudi business except "insurance, savings or banking operations. '' 69
51 Santire, supra note 45, at 565.
60 Companies Regulations, Royal Decree M/6, 22/3/1385 (1965), as amended
by Royal Decrees M/5, 12/3/1387, M/23, 28/6/1402 and M/46, 4/7/1405, re-
printed in 2 A. KEESEE, supra note 2.
61 Id. art. 40.
62 Santire, supra note 45, at 566.
62 Companies Regulations, supra note 60, art. 46.
64 Santire, supra note 45, at 566.
'5 Zerfas, Legal and Practical Issues in Forming and Operating Joint Ventures
(Part II), 2 Mir). E. EXEC. REP., Mar. 1979, at 3, 15.
66 Comment, supra note 4, at 301.
6 A footnote in the text of the regulation also defines the partnership as a "'Lim-
ited Liability Company,' a form of commercial company similar to the English 'private
company' with ownership represented by shares with restricted transferability whose
holders are liable for company debts only to the extent of their contributions to the
company's capital." Companies Regulations, supra note 60, art. 157. The limited lia-
bility partnership has also been likened to a United States closed corporation. Santire,
supra note 45, at 567.
66 Companies Regulations, supra note 60, art. 157.
69 Id. art. 159.
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Articles 157, 158, 159, 161 and 162 of the Companies Regulations
are the most pertinent parts to comply with in forming a limited liabil-
ity company. Article 161 prescribes certain particulars that must be in-
cluded in the Memorandum of Association, the signed agreement be-
tween the parties.70 Failure to comply with any of these pertinent
articles will result in the limited liability company "being considered
null and void as regards any interested party," 71 with the exception
that the partners cannot use the invalidity against third parties to shield
themselves. 7- The company must, within thirty days of formation, file
an application with the Companies Registrar at the Department of
Companies and have the Memorandum of Association published in the
Official Gazette. 73 Publication in the Official Gazette affords the gov-
ernment an excellent opportunity to scrutinize the company and the
agreements that have been made between the partners. As a result,
many companies have chosen to embody many of the proprietary provi-
sions in agreements, other than the Memorandum of Association, which
are not subject to government scrutiny.74 Publication also provides the
government with valuable details about the company enabling it to de-
termine compliance with government regulations.
The Companies Regulations do nor specify a minimum capital
amount that the Saudi company must contribute nor do they require
any specific degree of control that the Saudi partner must have. How-
ever, in the future, Saudi Arabia could join other Arab countries and
require that foreign investment in the Kingdom be conditioned upon
Saudi control of at least fifty-one percent of the company. 75 The Com-
panies Regulations allow the parties to specify, in the Memorandum of
Association, the rights conferred in net profits and partners equity
70 The Memorandum of Association must contain at least the following
provisions:
1) The kind, name, object, and head office of the partnership; 2) The
partners' names, residence addresses, occupations, and nationalities; 3)
The names of the managers, whether they are partners or nonpartners; 4)
The names of the members of the board of controllers, if any; 5) The
amount of capital and the amount of contribution in cash and in kind, as
well as detailed description of the contributions in kind, their value, and
the names of contributors in kind; 6) A statement by the partners that all
the capital shares have been allotted and paid up in full; 7) The method of
distribution of profits; 8) The dates of commencement and expiration of
the partnership; and 9) The form of the notices to be served by the part-
nership on the partners. Id. art. 161.
71 Id. art. 163.
72 Id.
73 Id. art. 164.
"' Homsy, A Digest of the Current Saudi Rules on Joint Ventures, 6 Mum. E.
ExEc. REP., Nov. 1983, 21, 22.
71 Santire, supra note 45, at 568.
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should the partners choose not to split them equally."6 This appears to
give the partners considerable latitude in structuring the limited liabil-
ity company, possibly allowing the United States partner to structure a
joint venture in which it shares profits equally but retains majority
managerial control. Practically, however, this will not happen because
of the minimum ownership and control requirements the government
has imposed in order for the company to obtain benefits under the For-
eign Capital Investment Code and Tenders Regulations."1
3.4. Formation of the'Limited Liability Company
Formation of the limited liability company, as with any joint ven-
ture, is no easy task."s It is also one that is time consuming. There is a
considerable time lapse between when negotiations begin and when the
company actually comes into being. A newspaper announcement of the
formation of the Texaco/Saudi Refining Company joint venture called
the twelve month development of that joint venture "speedy, despite its
size."1 9 The complex negotiations are not only a result of the particu-
lars of the company, but also a result of attempting to reconcile two
systems of law. Another reason for the time lapse is Saudi postpone-
ments: "It is not at all unusual for Saudis to miss appointments alto-
gether or to postpone them literally for weeks." 8 To the United States
investor this type of action is frustrating. However, to complain of the
delays to the Saudis could be seriously detrimental to the proposed joint
venture, since Saudis "tend to view impatience as a sign of bad man-
ners or a lack of self-confidence."'" Those who endure the delays and
show an understanding of this aspect of Saudi culture are often re-
warded with valuable deals."2
The documents which structure the joint venture usually provide
some indication of the complexity of the negotiations. The newspaper
article, referred to above, reported that the "document covering the
terms of the agreement is more than three inches thick, with pages
7' Companies Regulations, supra note 60, art. 171.
77 In order to receive the Xax holiday available under the Foreign Capital Invest-
ment Code, at least twenty-five percent of the capital must be Saudi owned. Foreign
Capital Investment Code, supra note 2, art. 7. In order to receive priority status when
bidding for a government contract at least fifty percent of the capital must be Saudi
owned. Saudi Arabian Tenders Regulations, Royal Decree M/14, art. I, 7/4/1397
(Mar. 27, 1977), reprinted in L. GLiCK, supra note 48, at 171.
78 Contra Zerfas, supra note 65, at 15.
'o Saudi Texaco Venture, supra note 1.
80 Note, supra note 5, at 175.
8l Id. at 176 (footnote omitted).
8' Id.; Comment, supra note 4, at 300.
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printed on both sides." 8 The Assistant General Counsel for Mobil
Chemical reported that "no single document lays out the guts of the
joint venture arrangement. Rather the relationship is detailed in a
number of different documents.18 4 Five documents comprise the joint
venture arrangement between Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company,
Inc. and Saudi Basic Industries Corporation. 5
One particularly troublesome area of joint venture formation is the
drafting of the purpose or objective clause of the joint venture. The
objective clauses in Articles of Incorporation of United States companies
are often open-ended statements which enable the company to pursue
almost any line of business. However, the Saudi government frowns on
such all-encompassing objective clauses.88 It is the government's intent
to allow foreign investment into Saudi Arabia when it appears that the
investment will be beneficial to the Saudi economy, technological devel-
opment, or to the government itself. Therefore, the government will
scrutinize the joint venture agreement to ascertain whether or not it
meets these qualifications. Since the objective clause must be contained
in the published Memorandum of Association, the government has easy
access to the information it desires. The government wants to be sure
that the foreign capital is truly devoted to development and wants strict
control of foreign companies' activities in the Kingdom. Consequently,
it will require specific, clear objective clauses: 1 "Applications [for For-
eign Capital Investment Licenses] are returned for having objectives
that are too broad and ambiguous."88
However, a company complying with this requirement, with a
specific, detailed clause, can be in legal tax trouble if it operates outside
its stated scope and enjoys profits from the operation. Profits obtained
by activities outside the scope of the objective clause can cause the com-
pany to lose its tax holiday, as discussed below. 9 As proposed by an
accountant specializing in international accounting, one solution to this
tax problem is "[w]hen applying for tax holiday. . . to widen the ob-
jects of the company as much as possible in order to cover activity in
which the company expects to be engaged."90 However, this course is
83 Saudi Texaco Venture, supra note 1, at C13, col. 2.
84 Letter from Wm. Douglas McDougall to Diane Weber (Nov. 17, 1988) (dis-
cussing Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company's joint venture in Saudi Arabia).
85 Id. The five agreements are: Joint Venture Agreements, Partnership Agree-
ments, Offtake Agreements, Service Agreements, and Loan Agreements.
88 See Taylor, supra note 54, at 91.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See text accompanying notes 141 & 142.
90 El-Bayouk, The Tax Holiday: Some Practical Guidelines, 5 MID. E. EXEC.
REP., Feb. 1982, at 3, 13.
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not advisable from a legal standpoint since the tax holiday application
is a separate document also subject to government scrutiny. Two differ-
ent objective clauses pertaining to the same company will, in all likeli-
hood, be looked upon unfavorably by the government and could put the
United States partner's potential investment in the Kingdom in jeop-
ardy. It appears that the conflict between these two policies can only be
resolved by limiting the scope of the business, perhaps at the expense of
forgoing future opportunities.
4. FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENT CODE
Through the highly desirable five or ten year tax holiday,"' the
government has an effective means of limiting and exercising control
over foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. The government has made the
holiday difficult for a company to pass up" and so advantageous to the
foreign company desiring to invest in the Kingdom that most companies
will attempt to obtain it: "The ten year tax holiday. . . is an attractive
inducement, particularly since, when coupled with an appropriate in-
vestment structure, it is possible for companies to operate in Saudi Ara-
bia free of local as well as home country taxation."9"
The holiday is contained in the Foreign Capital Investment Code
(hereinafter FCIC).94 The FCIC was implemented in 1979 to help
stimulate foreign investment in the country. Through such investment
the Saudi government hoped to use foreign technology, experience, and
expertise to better Saudi business capabilities:
[The] benefits are being given with the expectation that the
foreign firm will conduct itself with its Saudi partners so as
to enhance their experience and their capabilities, and with
the expectation that ultimately, the joint venture company
will create a genuine, independent, self-reliant, economic en-
terprise. ... [T]hat is the real result which the existing le-
gal requirements are attempting to achieve. To the extent
these results are not achieved, [it can be expected] that fur-
ther regulations will follow designed to more effectively
91 The Foreign Capital Investment Code provides a ten year tax holiday for in-
dustrial and agricultural enterprises and a five year holiday for all other enterprises,
provided certain requirements are met. Foreign Capital Investment Code, supra note 2,
art. 7(2).
92 Absent the tax holiday, a non-Saudi partner would be subject to an income tax
of up to forty-five percent on profits in excess of $300,000. Homsy, supra note 74, at
23.
" Taylor, supra note 54, at 89.
U Foreign Capital Investment Code, supra note 2.
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guarantee that result. .... 95
Ten years after its promulgation, the FCIC has become the primary
vehicle through which the Saudi government exercises control over for-
eign companies and jointly owned limited liability companies. In order
to obtain the coveted benefit of the tax holiday, a company must comply
with a complex maze of provisions not limited exclusively to those in
the code itself.96 As a result, the United States investor must check com-
pliance with other Saudi regulations in order to enjoy the tax holiday.
The heart of the code is Article 2, which provides that
[a]ny investment of foreign capital" must be authorized by a
license to be issued by the Minister of Industry Committee,
and must meet the following two conditions: (1) It must be
invested in an economic development project, which term, for
purposes hereof, does not include petroleum and mineral
projects; and (2) It must be made in connection with the util-
ization of foreign technical know-how.98
The code further establishes a committee (the Foreign Capital Invest-
ment Committee) to oversee the investment of all foreign capital into
Saudi Arabia.99 This Committee has the powers to recommend projects
it deems to be economically developmental, to review applications for
foreign capital investment, to consider both complaints made by foreign
investors and disputes arising from application of the code, to make
recommendations for penalties to be imposed on those who violate the
code and to provide for implementation of the FCIC.'00 Through such
discretionary authority, the Committee wields immense power over for-
eign capital investment policy and over the choice of companies permit-
ted to operate in the Kingdom.
The Committee has used its discretionary powers to create several
requirements that are not explicitly stated in the code as originally
promulgated. In order to qualify as an economic development project,
the project must fit into one of the categories specified by the Minister
" Zerfas, Legal and Practical Issues in Forming and OperatingJoint Ventures
(Part I), 2 MID. E. EXEC. REP., Feb. 1979, at 3, 17.
98 Enterprises that enjoy benefits under the code are "subject to the Regulations
for Workmen and Social Insurance and other laws and regulations in force in the
Kingdom." Foreign Capital Investment Code, supra note 2, art. 8.
" Foreign capital is defined in the code as "any monies, notes, bonds, instruments,
machinery, equipment spare parts, raw materials, products, means of transport, rights,
including patents and trade mark, and similar assets. . . ... Id. art. 1.
98 Id. art. 2.
99 Id. art. 5.
100 Id.
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of Industry and Electricity.' The five types of economic development
projects that have been identified are industrial, agricultural, health de-
velopment, services and contracting projects.1°2 The important criteria
used to determine the desirability of a project are whether it will em-
ploy and train Saudi nationals, what type and how much technology
will be imparted to the Kingdom, and what the potential is for the
project to expand the manufacturing capabilities of the Kingdom. 03
Development ventures are ones that are in keeping with the five year
Development Plans of the government. 0 One attorney commented that
"[a]ny foreign applicant will significantly increase its chances of ob-
taining a license if it demonstrates to the Foreign Capital Investment
Committee a specific program for training Saudi Arabians in technical
fields."' 05 However, the fact that a joint venture may meet the qualifi-
cations and fit in an approved category of development projects does not
guarantee that it will receive a Foreign Capital Investment license. The
discretionary0 6 powers of the Committee and the Minister of Industry
and Electricity allow them to grant or reject licenses based on market
conditions or policy considerations.'0 7 Therefore, selective licensing oc-
curs, and when the Minister determines that a development area has
become crowded, further licenses will be denied.'0 8
A second example of the ability of the Committee to influence re-
quirements of the code involves control of the classification of enter-
prises. Industrial enterprises enjoy a ten year tax holiday under the
FCIC.'0 9 Industrial projects have been defined as involving "processing
of raw or semi-finished materials or the fabrication of finished or semi-
finished products for industrial or consumer use.""' However, this def-
inition is rather broad and, as with other regulations in this area, is
subject to further expansion or restriction by the Foreign Capital In-
vestment Committee."' The Committee, therefore, has the power to
limit the availability of the holiday to foreign investors simply by
changing the definition. If the Committee should, without warning, re-
1:1 Homsy, supra note 24, at 52.
102 Id.
103 Homsy, supra note 74, at 21.
104 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 65; Taylor, supra note 54, at 89.
10: Homsy, supra note 74, at 21.
106 Gray, Who is Covered By Tough New Foreign Investment Rules?, 7 MID. E.
ExEc. REP., May 1984, at 19.
107 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 66.
108 Id.; See also Homsy, supra note 74, at 21; Gray, supra note 106, at 20 (Some
areas that have been reported to be closing to foreign investment are construction, gen-
eral contracting and maintenance).
109 Foreign Capital Investment Code, supra note 2, art. 7(2).
11o Taylor, supra note 54, at 88.
'll Id. at 88-89.
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strict the definition, it is possible that, after lengthy negotiations, the
United States investor may have an enterprise which no longer fits the
definition of an industrial enterprise.
Several categories of enterprises are not subject to the FCIC Regu-
lations.112 One category encompasses those investments of foreign capi-
tal which were already existing at the time the regulations became ef-
fective. 13 However, increases in the operations or capital of such
enterprises are subject to the regulations.11 Since the code is almost ten
years old and the maximum holiday under the code is ten years, this
exception is of no practical use to a United States investor. A second
category of enterprises exempt from the regulations includes projects
that are permitted to operate in Saudi Arabia by virtue of special
agreements by the government or its agencies." 5 Other activities not
covered by the regulations are those within the sphere of consulting or
professional services, banking and certain activities permitted by the
Minister of Commerce under Article 228 of the Companies Regula-
tions." 6 However, since a limited liability company cannot be formed
in the area of banking, 1 7 freedom from compliance with the regula-
tions is of no value to United States companies.
Procuring a special agreement with the Saudi government, one of
its agencies, or a corporation owned by the government can be a way to
avoid meeting the requirement that the project be economically develop-
mental. This approach could be extremely helpful if the United States
company is interested in investing in an area where licenses are being
granted sparingly or in the field of petroleum and mineral projects.
However, making an agreement with the government is risky given the
volatile state of affairs in the Middle East. Should the government
change, a United States company may find that its interest in the joint
venture is in jeopardy.
The tax holiday is not the sole benefit conferred upon foreign in-
vestment by the FCIC. Article 7 of the FCIC provides for acquisition
of real estate by the foreign investor and confers additional benefits on
industrial enterprises." 8 However, as is the case with other Saudi regu-
lations, the investor does not find these benefits enumerated in Article
7, but rather must go searching through other regulations to find them.
Rules governing the acquisition of real estate by the investor, in all
112 Foreign Capital Investment Code, supra note 2, art. 9.
113 Id.
114 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 69.
Foreign Capital Investment Code, supra note 2, art. 9(2).
116 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 69.
Companies Regulations, supra note 60, art. 159.
118 Foreign Capital Investment Code, supra note 2, art. 7(1), (3).
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likelihood a necessity for the limited liability company, can be found in
the Regulations concerning the Ownership of Real Property by Non-
Saudis." 9 Benefits for industrial projects can be found in the Regula-
tions for Protection and Encouragement of Domestic Industries.1
20
Although the FCIC directs the investor to these two regulations by
specifically naming them, one benefit for foreign investment that the
code does not refer to is the Saudi Industrial Development Fund1
2'
(hereinafter SIDF). Since the SIDF was promulgated before the FCIC,
like the two benefits mentioned above, it is quite possible that it may be
overlooked. Investors may not anticipate that substantial benefits for
foreign investment, like the SIDF, would have existed before the enact-
ment of the FCIC, because of the importance of the FCIC to the gov-
ernance of foreign investment. The SIDF is a desirable benefit because
it can provide industrial loans for up to fifty percent of a project cost at
minimal charges to enterprises with Saudi participation.12 2 Since the
participation requirement is the same for the tax holiday, some mention
of the SIDF in the code would have been appropriate to alert the for-
eign investor. The example of the SIDF demonstrates that there may
be other -benefits lurking in Saudi laws if the investor is willing to
search diligently for them. However, attorney and consulting fees may
make such a search a costly endeavor.
4.1. Tax Holiday
The tax holiday is the premier benefit for foreign capital invest-
ment in Saudi Arabia. The holiday exempts industrial and agricultural
enterprises from corporate and income taxes for ten years, as long as
they comply with the FCIC.123 All other types of enterprises receive a
five year exemption.' 24 However, in order to obtain and maintain the
benefit, the foreign investor must carefully comply, not only with all
applicable regulations in the FCIC, but also with all "other laws and
regulations in force in the Kingdom."' 1 2' Grants of the tax holiday, be-
cause its benefit is so substantial, invoke intense government scrutiny on
119 Regulations Concerning the Ownership. of Real Property by Non-Saudis,
Royal Decree M/22, art. 2, 12/7/1390 (1970), reprinted in 2 N. KARAM, BUSINE.SS
LAWS OF SAUDI ARABIA (1989).
120 Law for the Protection and Encouragement of National Industry, Royal De-
cree M/50, 23/12/1381 (1962), reprinted in 2 N. KARAM, supra note 119.
121 Saudi Industrial Development Fund Regulations, Royal Decree M/3 (1974),
reprinted in 2 A. KEESEE, supra note 2.
122 Id. art. 4(6).
12' Foreign Capital Investment Code, supra note 2, art. 7(2).
124 Id.
... Id. art. 8.
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the limited liability company. The primary requirement before the tax
holiday is granted is that Saudi capital in the company must comprise
at least twenty-five percent of the total capital, and this percentage
must be sustained throughout the exemption period.' 26 Through the tax
holiday the government has, in effect, nullified the no minimum capital
requirements of the Companies Regulations for limited liability compa-
nies. As a result, almost all limited liability companies will consist of at
least twenty-five percent Saudi capital.
The tax holiday for all projects takes effect "as of the date on
which production commences."'1 27 Difficulties for the United States in-
vestor arise because production has not been defined for agricultural or
industrial projects. It is therefore advisable to have someone from the
Department of Zakat and Income Tax, the Ministry of Industry and
Electricity or the Ministry of Agriculture witness the first day of pro-
duction. 2 ' Doing this will be easier than trying to prove production
after the fact.' 2 9 However, for other types of enterprises, the date of
commencement of production has been considered the date of registra-
tion in the commercial register.1
3 0
Designating the date of production as the date of registration, the
Saudi government has created a loophole which can be used to catch
and tax some foreign investors. If the foreign investor must procure
contracts and engage in preparatory activities before the final agree-
ment with the Saudi partner is signed and the venture registered, then
the contracts signed and activities undertaken before the registration are
subject to taxation. 13' The only solution to this problem would be to
have the contracts taken in the name of the Saudi partner " 2 and then
transferred or assigned to the joint venture once the holiday begins.' 3
However, because the Saudi and foreign partner have yet to sign an
agreement, the Saudi partner may not want to undertake such a bur-
den. Third parties as well may not want to enter into such contracts
12 Id. art. 7(2).
127 Id.
128 El-Bayouk, supra note 90, at 13.
129 Id.
130 Taylor, supra note 54, at 90. But see Zerfas, supra note 64, at 15 ("[Ilt
should be noted that although there has been confusion in the past, based on a ruling
from the Department of Taxation, it now appears that in construction projects the tax
holiday commences on the date the first contract is signed after the joint venture re-
ceives its foreign investment license.") (emphasis in original).
131 Homsy, supra note 24, at 54; see also Zerfas, supra note 65, at 15 ("Profits
from contracts signed before the license is received are not entitled to a tax holiday,
even if the profits are actually received after the holiday commences.").
12 Saudis are not subject to income tax, but instead pay only a "Zakat" (religious
tax). E1-Sayed, Income Tax Guide, 3 MID. E. ExEc. REP., Feb. 1980, at 3.
13' Homsy, supra note 74, at 23.
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since it is still uncertain whether the joint venture will actually come
into being. Because the holiday is for only five years after the registra-
tion of the company, the venture is at a disadvantage if contract negoti-
ations that are necessary to commercially begin the enterprise take
some time after registration. In order to get the full benefit of the holi-
day, the venture should hold off registering until a few days before
signing the contract."3 4 In that way, no part of the holiday is forfeited.
The amount of time between the granting of the license and the regis-
tration of the company cannot exceed six months however, or the For-
eigr Capital Investment Committee has the right to revoke the
license.' 5
Even though the limited liability company is exempt from taxes,
the government requires it to file a tax return. It must file the same
information as a company which is not subject to the exemption.' 36
Since August 1983, the Department of Zakat and Income Tax has re-
quired that all documents and submissions made to the tax authorities
be made in Arabic.' 7 The tax authorities are to reject any filings pre-
pared outside the Kingdom and "to assess tax arbitrarily on any com-
pany which does not present its accounts in the Arabic language certi-
fied by an accountant licensed to practice in the Kingdom."'3 8 The
government further requires that all the books of the company be kept
locally and in Arabic.. 9 which, for complex transactions add substantial
translation costs to the company. 4 A primary purpose for requiring
the tax holiday company to file income tax returns is, once again, gov-
ernmental scrutiny. The government wants to examine all sources of
profit to be sure they have been derived only from the objectives of the
company.' 4' If any profits have come from sources outside the .scope of
the objectives, they will be subject to income tax. More important than
being subject to income tax, if the government discovers that the com-
pany is operating outside the scope of its stated objectives, the company
could be in jeopardy of losing the holiday, be subjected to tax penalties
's' E1-Bayouk, supra note 90, at 13.
"s The license expressly provides that the Ministry may cancel it if the partners
do not take the measures necessary to implement the license within six months from its
date. A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 68.
138 E1-Bayouk, supra note 90, at 13.
Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Directorate of Zakat and Income
Tax, Circular No. 81551/2 To All Licensed Accountants, Offices of Legal Advisors and
Consulting Companies, August 1, 1983, reprinted in 6 MID. E. ExEc. REP., Nov.
1983, at 27.
13' Id. (emphasis added).
139 Id.
140 Bil-'Arabi, Min Fadlak (In Arabic Please), 6 MID. E. EXEC. REP., Nov.
1983, at 25.
'4' El-Bayouk, supra note 90, at 13.
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and retroactive taxes on the unauthorized activities or lose its Foreign
Capital Investment Jicense altogether.
142
There are two unsettled areas of taxation facing the joint venture
and posing potential legal complications for the United States investor.
One area involves interest earned by the company. This interest has
been treated as not covered by the holiday, resulting in the United
States investor having to pay the tax on its proportionate share. How-
ever, no final decision has been made concerning this taxation and con-
sideration is being given to exempting interest that occurs as a result of
the normal course of business. 143 Secondly, the Department of Zakat
and Income Tax has held that a joint venture of two or more compa-
nies may be considered a consortium and that profit realized from the
consortium is subject to tax, although the joint venture is a tax holiday
company.14 4 No final decision has been made in this area either.
Therefore, it is imperative for a United States investor to obtain accu-
rate tax advice regarding both these situations before entering into a
joint venture agreement.
Once the tax holiday period has ended, the foreign entity becomes
subject to income taxes. 145 Extensions of the holiday are rare, but the
possibility exists if the company can show substantial additions to the
joint venture or an undertaking of a genuinely new project.146
4.2. Profit Sharing
Although the Companies Regulations do not require the profit
sharing of a limited liability company to equal the amount of equity
ownership, 147 this is not true in the case of the FCIC. A conflict there-
fore exists between the two regulations, with a disadvantageous result
to United States companies, as the FCIC regulations have been given
priority. Restrictions have been placed on the unequal distribution
right: "Ministry of Commerce Circular 11-1088 issued by the Commit-
tee for Classification of Contractors points out that to qualify under the
Foreign Capital Investment Code, the Saudi partner must share pro-
portionally in the ownership of fixed assets and have an effective role
in the management of the enterprise."' 48 This requirement provides the
Saudi government with yet another means with which to catch the
142 Homsy, supra note 74, at 23.
1'1 El-Bayouk, supra note 90, at 14.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
I48 Taylor, supra note 54, at 92 (emphasis added).
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United States investor:
[T]here seems to be a basic, though not formalized, rule that
if the distribution of profits differs more than ten percent
from share ownership, the Foreign Capital Investment Com-
mittee will question the validity of the limited liability com-
pany. If the distortion affects the twenty-five percent mini-
mum, the tax holiday could be disallowed.'49
Therefore, taking both the Companies Regulations and the FCIC to-
gether, the Saudi partner must not only be allocated a fair percentage
of profit but also a proportionate percentage of duties of the venture.
The United States company could probably not then effectively "buy
off" the Saudi partner 'by giving it a large percentage of profits in re-
turn for a large percentage of managerial control of the business. Per-
haps this is because the government wants the Saudi businessmen to
have significant roles in the Venture so that they can learn the skills
necessary to operate such a venture in anticipation of the day when the
government decides to restrict foreign investment altogether.'50 Foreign
investment is therefore serving the purpose of relieving the Saudi gov-
ernment and business sector of some of the costs of obtaining the neces-
sary expertise and technological know-how to operate businesses on
their own.
The only "way to structure the company to achieve a significant
variance of control and profit sharing is at the expense of foregoing the
tax holiday. The United States partner could own fifty percent of the
venture and could enter into a management contract with the venture.
The taxes on the proceeds which flow to the foreign company as a
result of the management contract, which are exempt from the tax holi-
day, are nonetheless eligible for reimbursement by the venture. Fur-
thermore, the foreign company can deduct the reimbursements against
its profits. Therefore, the tax burden of the management contract is
149 Santire, supra note 56, at 11. But see Cartwright & Hamza, Service Agents
Regulation and Related Laws Affecting Foreign Companies in Saudi Arabia, 17
INT'L LAw. 203, 212 (1983) ("It is nearly universally recognized that [the requirement
that Saudis own twenty-five percent of a company's capital] does not mean that Saudi
shareholders must also be entitled to at least twenty-five percent of the profits of the
joint venture company . . ").
150 "We also believe that the intent [of the tax holiday legislation] is that the joint
ventures will become truly independent companies, rather than mere legal cloaks under
which foreign companies perform operations in the same manner they would with di-
rect contracts. . . . [Tihe regulations are having their intended effect. We are witness-
ing an evolutionary process in Saudi Arabia whereby many who were formerly passive
commission agents are now becoming sophisticated businessmen with their own support
staffs. . . ." Zerfas, supra note 95, at 17.
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distributed among the partners.' 51
5. THE TENDERS REGULATIONS
The Saudi Arabian Tenders Regulations' 52 apply to contracts
made between companies, foreign and domestic, and the Saudi govern-
ment.' 5 3 Since the majority of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia is
involved in government contracts,'" compliance with the Tenders Reg-
ulations is important.
The Tenders Regulations provide for a preference in governmen-
tal contracts for Saudi Arabian goods, companies and individuals. 55
Such preference for Saudi goods is applicable even when the Saudi
manufactured good is of lesser quality than a comparable foreign
good.' 5 6 The Saudi product need only be "satisfactory."' 57 Evidence
suggests that in the past, the rules had not been strictly enforced. How-
ever, government officials have been pushing for stricter observation of
the requirements. 5
To further promote this "Buy Saudi" policy, the Ministry of In-
dustry and Electricity publishes a list of locally manufactured goods for
governmental projects.' 59 Since "all government contracts are theoreti-
cally required to contain a clause obligating contractors to purchase
goods on the list,"0 a limited liability company which is contracting
with the government must likewise include such a clause. Oversight of
this requirement or ignorance of the "Buy Saudi" rules could jeopard-
ize the license of the limited liability company. Since the FCIC requires
compliance with "other laws and regulations in force in the King-
dom,""6 the tax holiday benefit could also be in jeopardy if a company
fails to abide by the "Buy Saudi" rules. A contractor cannot even im-
port goods similar to those on the list,6 2 and foreign companies cannot
import supplies and consumer products for their employees. A Saudi
firm must import the product for the limited liability company, if the
151 Santire, supra note 56, at 11.
'52 Tenders Regulations, supra note 77.
'5' Id. art. I(a).
15' L. GLICK, supra note 48, at 170.
155 Tenders Regulations, supra note 77, art. I(d).
'"' Id. art. I(e).
151 L. GLICK, supra note 48, at 165 (quoting Resolution of Council of Ministers
No. 1977 dated 17.11.1396 (Nov. 17, 1976)); see Simpson, supra note 6, at 17.
158 L. GLICK, supra note 48, at 166.
150 Id. at 168.
160 Id.
"Ie Foreign Capital Investment Code, supra note 2, art. 8.
16 L. GLICK, supra note 48, at 168.
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good is not available locally. 6 '
The watchful eye of the government has placed an enforcement
mechanism for the "Buy Saudi" requirements in the Tender Regula-
tions Implementing Rules.'" The rules require that a company which
has submitted a bid must include on its price list whether the items on
the list are produced or manufactured in the Kingdom, another Arab
League country or a foreign country. 6 This section serves two pur-
poses: 1) to monitor compliance with the "Buy Saudi" rules, and 2) to
monitor compliance with the Israeli Boycott rules.
The Tender Regulations, however, do give limited liability compa-
nies a significant advantage. These companies have second priority in
dealing with the Saudi government, provided that Saudi ownership of
the company is more than fifty percent.' 66 Limited liability companies
wishing to engage in the business of regularly procuring government
contracts must therefore be willing to give the Saudi partner(s) majority
ownership control in order to obtain the bid preference. The United
States partner may want, in return for minority ownership, to retain
majority managerial control or a majority share of profits. As was dis-
cussed above, share of the majority of managerial control and profits
does not have to coincide with equity ownership so long as the Saudi
partner is meaningfully participating in the operation of the company
and the distribution of profits.'
6 8
While the Tenders Regulations provide the limited liability com-
pany (and hence the United States investor) with a significant benefit,
it comes at the expense of the freedom to design the company as it
desires and as the Companies Regulations permit.'69 If the company
anticipates needing or desiring to procure government contracts on a
regular basis, it must give the Saudi partner(s) majority ownership con-
trol. Failure to grant majority ownership control will place the com-
pany on the bottom of the totem pole for government contracts. Given
the government's preference for supporting Saudi business and the
growing sophistication of Saudi businessmen as a result of the govern-
ment policies regarding foreign investment, the limited liability com-
pany with less than fifty percent Saudi equity may effectively have no
chance at all for these contracts in the near future.
13 Id. (discussing Saudi Port Authority Release dated Aug. 1, 1978).
... Rules for Implementation of Tenders Regulations, Ministerial Resolution
2131/97, 5/51397 (Apr. 23, 1977), reprinted in L. GLmcK, supra note 48, at 177.
185 Id. art. 7(b).
16' Tenders Regulations, supra note 77, art. I(d).
187 See text accompanying note 76.
'e See text accompanying note 147.
169 See text accompanying note 76.
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6. ARBITRATION
A provision for the settlement of disputes should be included in the
Memorandum of Association; these provisions should address not only
disputes between the partners, but also disputes in contractual relations
between the company and third parties. Before forming the limited lia-
bility company, it is important to discuss how each partner anticipates
disputes will be resolved and according to what methods and proce-
dures. This is especially important given the Saudi view that no Saudi
can be bound to any other law but the Shari'a."7 ' A growing trend for
dealing with disputes in Saudi Arabia is the use of arbitration. A his-
torical analysis of arbitration clauses in articles of association of Saudi
companies from 1966 to 19801.1 found that "mixed companies, both on
the basis of absolute number and percentage proportion, tended to pro-
vide for arbitration in their articles of association more than purely
Saudi companies did . ...
In order to avoid being trapped and left with no choice but to
apply Saudi law, some companies have instead chosen to provide for
international arbitration. However, this is not a guaranteed cure-all:
"It is widespread practice to include arbitration clauses for interna-
tional arbitration in private contracts. Such clauses are generally re-
garded as lawful but unenforceable.' 73 Saudi Arabian law regarding
the lawfulness and enforceability of arbitration clauses is currently in a
state of confusion. This confusion can be hazardous to the United
States investor seeking to protect himself.
6.1. Place of Arbitration
Whether or not arbitration must be held in Saudi Arabia in order
for the award to be enforceable in the Kingdom is an unsettled question
of Saudi law. It is also a question of great interest to United States
investors and attorneys counselling them. It is important to know what
law will govern the resolution of disputes before one enters into the
business relationship.
Between 1975 and 1979, the trend among limited liability compa-
nies was to specify, in their Memorandum of Association, that arbitra-
tion was to take place outside the Kingdom.'74 These companies were
170 See text accompanying note 13.
"I A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 177.
172 Id.
173 Moore & Lott, Arbitration Under the Saudi Legal System, 4 MID. E. ExEc.
REP., Feb. 1981, at 11 (emphasis added).
14 In 1975, only three companies provided for arbitration outside the Kingdom.
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allowed to register with the Commercial Register Office.75 with this
provision included in the Memorandum of Association. However, in
1979, the Deputy Ministry of Commerce directed all branches of the
Ministry and the Commercial Register Office in Riyadh not to approve
or register any articles of association of Saudi companies containing a
clause providing for the resolution of disputes between the partners or
the partners and the company by means of arbitration outside the
Kingdom.' 76 The circular further stated that "arbitration shall be per-
formed inside the Kingdom in accordance with effective regulations and
instructions."17 Finally, the circular declared that an arbitration clause
contained in the articles of association of Saudi companies which pro-
vided for the submission of any disputes arising between contract par-
ties to an arbitration committee outside the Kingdom is "considered ab-
solutely void."' s As a result of that resolution, in 1980 no articles of
association provided for arbitration outside the Kingdom nor did any
call for the application of non-Saudi law. 7 The Saudi government
went a step further in regulating arbitration clauses, by promulgating
the Arbitration Regulations in 1983180 and, in 1985, the Arbitration
Regulations Implementing Rules. 8 '
Looking at the regulation, it appears that all arbitration clauses
must therefore provide for arbitration in Saudi Arabia. Strangely
enough, however, the government did not so specify when it promul-
gated the Arbitration Regulations 82 or the Implementing Rules:" 3
"[The Arbitration Regulations] are silent on the issue of whether the
In 1976, 1977, and 1978, twenty-two, twenty and twenty-six companies, respectively,
provided for arbitration abroad. During those same years, only nine, ten, and ten com-
panies, respectively, provided for arbitration within Saudi Arabia. In 1979, the number
of companies specifying for arbitration outside the Kingdom had again dropped to only
three. However, that drop can be somewhat attributed to a promulgation by the gov-
ernment, in 1979, condemning memoranda of association containing clauses calling for
arbitration outside the Kingdom. A. LERRICK AND Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 177-83.
178 The Office of the Commercial Register is the agency of the government which
issues the necessary registration in order for the company to operate in the Kingdom.
See text accompanying note 46.
17' Deputy Minister of Commerce Circular No. 3/9/sh/331/9/2903, 13/3/
1399H, reprinted in A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 507.
177 Id.
178 Id.
178 Id. at 166-68.
180 Arbitration Regulations, Royal Decree M/46, 1, 9, 12/7/1403 (April 25,
1985)(note that the regulations were published in the Gazette Umm Al-Qura on 22/
8/1403 (June 3, 1983)), reprinted in 2 A. KEESEE, supra note 2.
181 Arbitration Regulations Implementing Rules, Council of Ministers Resolution
No. 7/2021/M, 8/9/1405 H (May 27,1985) reprinted in A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN,
supra note 58, at 499.
182 See Arbitration Regulations, supra note 180.
18I See Arbitration Regulations Implementing Rules, supra note 181.
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arbitration proceedings must be held within Saudi Arabia in order for
the parties to be able to obtain a stay of judicial proceedings or to ob-
tain enforcement of the award under the Regulations."' 84 One author-
ity has commented:
[I]f the arbitration proceedings are carried out in accordance
with the procedural formalities provided in the [Arbitration]
Regulations and the Implementing Rules and Saudi law is
applied in the proceedings, the parties would be permitted to
hold the arbitration proceedings in a place of mutual conve-
nience outside the Kingdom and to obtain an award enforce-
able under the Regulations."8 5
It cannot, however, be assumed that because the Arbitration Regula-
tions and Implementing Rules do not expressly exclude arbitration
outside the Kingdom, that the 1979 Ministry of Commerce Circular is
no longer good law. Regulations promulgated in the form of Ministry
memoranda or circulars carry the same weight as royal decrees unless
they are inconsistent with the royal decrees.
18 6
Although the government promulgated the Arbitration Regulations
and Implementing Rules with no restriction on a situs outside the
Kingdom, the government, in the circular, directed all branches of the
Ministry and the Commercial Register office to reject companies which
included arbitration clauses providing for arbitration outside Saudi
Arabia.' This, in essence, specifies that all arbitration must be held in
the Kingdom, just as if it were expressly stated in the Arbitration Reg-
ulations providing yet another example of a situation in which a United
States investor seeking to invest in Saudi Arabia must go beyond the
royal decrees to fully comply with Saudi law. The government has hid-
den a relatively important restriction in a memorandum from one of its
Ministries instead of including it in the official promulgation of regula-
tions. The result of non-compliance with this provision can be costly to
the United States investor as the Memorandum of Association may be
rejected. If the time spent reaching agreement on this provision was
substantial, the monetary loss alone will be great.
6.2. Choice of Law
Saudi law regarding choice of law for arbitration is equally un-
clear. The Arbitration Regulations do not explicitly call for Saudi Law
184 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 160.
185 Id.
188 Asherman, supra note 11, at 325.
187 See A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 507.
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to be the choice of law in the arbitration proceedings.' 88 However, Arti-
cle 39 of the Implementing Rules provides that arbitration awards
"shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic
shari'ah and regulations in effect."' 89 Although it has been asserted
that shari'a is divine law and no Saudi national or company can agree
to be bound by any other law, 9 ' the government's actions have not
always been in keeping with this principle. Most significantly, Saudi
Arabia's ratification in 1980' of the Washington Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States 9' (hereinafter Convention), is contrary to the position
that shari'a is supreme. Saudi Arabia's endorsement of the Convention
leaves United States investors once again wondering what Saudi law
does and does not allow in this area.
The Convention established the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")."9' The ICSID is a forum for
the resolution of disputes between signatory governments and parties
who are nationals of other States. 94 The ICSID provisions only apply
to contracts in which the government and the party explicitly agree to
submit disputes to the ICSID.195 Although the Convention went into
force in 1966, the Saudi government did not ratify it until 1980.196 Par-
ties that are signatories to the Convention agree to waive local jurisdic-
tion and agree that the ICSID arbitration decisions are binding in the
courts of the signatories.'97 While Saudi Arabia ratified the convention,
the government reserved the right not to submit to the ICSID questions
"'pertaining to oil and pertaining to acts of sovereignty. .. " 98
There has been no interpretation of this reservation yet, and "acts of
sovereignty" remains a vague, undefined term thought to mean the dis-
cretionary rights of the government.' 99
188 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 163. But see Arbitration Regula-
tions, supra note 180, art. 20, (enforceability of arbitrator's order is conditioned on the
absence of provisions contrary to the Shari'a point of view).
189 Arbitration Regulations Implementing Rules, supra note 181, art. 39, at 505.
"I See text accompanying note 17.
191 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 169 n.84.
191 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 17. U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter Convention].
193 Id. art. 1(1).
194 Id. art. 1(2).
19. Id. art. 25(1).
198 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 169 n.84.
197 Convention, supra note 192, art. 54(1).
198 Taylor, supra note 54, at 93 (quoting from Saudi Arabia: Into ICSID-with
Reservations, 3 MiD. E. EXEC. REP., June 1980, at 13, 24.).
199 Id.; A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 169 n.84.
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The ratification of the Convention, after the Ministry of Com-
merce circular,200 appears to contradict the directives of that circular.
Furthermore, it appears to contradict the exclusive jurisdiction given to
the Board of Grievances over disputes to which the government is a
party.20 1 The ramifications of the ICSID ratification, the Board of
Grievance jurisdiction, and the willingness of the Saudi Arabian gov-
ernment to apply the principles of both to arbitration clauses and arbi-
tration proceedings between the government and a foreign party has not
yet been tested.202 It is not clear, therefore, whether United States in-
vestors can contract with the government or an agency of the govern-
ment with a provision for arbitration providing for the application of
non-Saudi law.
This dilemma provides an interesting twist with regards to the
limited liability company. If the Saudi government were to allow full
application of the Convention, a limited liability company in a contract
with the government would, therefore, be allowed to provide for appli-
cation of non-Saudi law in its arbitration clauses.20 3 However, the gov-
ernment has constructed yet another loophole by which it can require
the United States/Saudi limited liability company to apply Saudi law.
The limited liability company, in order to operate in the Kingdom, ex-
ists as a Saudi juristic person,20 4 thereby making inapplicable the provi-
sions of the Convention, which governs disputes between a government
and a foreign party: "Practically speaking, even in cases involving ma-
jority foreign participation, it is improbable that the Saudi Government
will agree to treat a Saudi juristic person as the national of another
State.
20 5
Given the inconsistencies in the rules regarding arbitration, the
United States company wishing to invest will find it most desirable to
use arbitrators in the Kingdom. A statement made by two attorneys in
1981, noting that "[t]he government of Saudi Arabia has yet to take a
uniformly consistent position on arbitration,"20 6 still rings true today
even though the Arbitration Regulations and Implementing Rules have
200 See supra note 176.
201 The Board of Grievances has jurisdiction over disputes to which the govern-
ment is a party; this jurisdiction includes contract disputes. A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN,
supra note 58, at 240. The Board of Grievances derives this jurisdiction from regula-
tions promulgated in 1982. Id. at 238 n.334.
202 Taylor, supra note 54, at 94.
203 See id.
204 Id. at 87.
205 A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 58, at 172.
206 Moore & Lott, supra note 173. The statement was made by Miami attorneys,
Moore and Lott, who have practiced in Saudi Arabia with the firm of Hassan
Mahassni, Burlingham, Underwood & Lord.
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been promulgated since that statement was made.
7. CONCLUSION
This comment has attempted to examine the various aspects of
Saudi Law which present challenges to a United States investor wish-
ing to establish a joint venture with a Saudi partner in the Kingdom.
These challenges have developed as a result of what appears to be gov-
ernmental attempts, in piecemeal fashion, to curtail foreign investment.
While strong incentives for United States/Saudi Arabian joint ventures
still exist, limitations on the structure of such ventures continue to show
up, not in the regulations specifically dealing with foreign investment,
but rather in other regulations governing commercial activity in the
Kingdom. The regulations emerge not only in the royal decrees of the
monarch, but also in a maze of memoranda and circulars of delegated
authorities. The United States investor must search for regulations and
directives in widely scattered locations throughout the government. A
substantial monetary loss is the risk of failing to adequately familiarize
oneself with the Saudi laws.
It is not clear exactly why the Saudi government appears to be
stepping back from its policy of encouraging foreign investment as em-
bodied in the Foreign Capital Investment Code of 1979. Perhaps the
Saudi markets have become overcrowded and the government is at-
tempting to protect Saudi local business. More importantly though,
perhaps the Saudis have gained the technological and economic devel-
opment the foreign capital was designed to stimulate, and the Saudis
may now want to become major foreign investors themselves. If this is
true, one can probably look for continued restrictions placed on foreign
investment in Saudi Arabia and one can expect more Saudi participa-
tion, like the Texaco/Saudi Arabian Star Enterprise, in business op-
portunities outside the Kingdom.
[Vol. 11:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss4/3
